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In the target article ‘Functional and Descriptive Contextualism’ the argument is made 
that Functional Contextualism may benefit from the Interbehavioral tradition. This 
commentary supports this perspective. The Functional Contextual approach is elaborated, and 
some of its weaknesses are highlighted. Following this some descriptions of analyses of 
complex behavioral events are presented, which permits a comparison of Functional 
Contextual and Interbehavioral approaches to such events. The ways in which Interbehavioral 
concepts proved to be of use in our analyses are then described. The implications of these 
concepts for Functional Contextualists are discussed. 
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In concluding their article L.J. Hayes and Fryling suggested that “Interbehaviorism 
and Interbehavioral Psychology may be of service to work in Functional Contextualism.” (L.J. 
Hayes & Fryling, 2019, p 125). We find ourselves in firm agreement with this sentiment. 
Indeed, this is precisely what we have found in our own analyses of behavior. Specifically, 
when our experimental analyses pushed to the edge of conceptual analyses produced with a 
Functional Contextualist approach we found ourselves reaching for concepts that are clearly 
articulated within Interbehaviorism. Critically, some of these concepts are underemphasized 
within the existing Functional Contextual approach. In light of our experiences part of our 
commentary will involve outlining what emerged for us as issues with Functional 
Contextualism, and the Interbehavioral concepts that proved useful to us. The objective is not 
to champion one or other perspective. Instead, our purpose is to illustrate with specific 
examples how these two philosophical approaches may complement each other.  
Before proceeding it seems appropriate that we note some features of both Functional 
Contextualism and Interbehaviorism relevant to our analyses of behavior. Although the 
survey is not exhaustive, it does provide an opportunity to comment on arguments made 
regarding each approach that are presented in the target article. We begin a brief discussion of 
the merits of Functional Contextualism, before then describing how the analyses we offer here 
were complemented by adopting concepts from Interbehaviorism. 
The merits of Functional Contextualism 
 Pragmatism is a commendable and perhaps defining feature of Functional 
Contextualism. By stating its pragmatism explicitly Functional Contextualism encourages 
analysts to engage in related practices; for example, by clearly stating goals in advance of 
analyses and encouraging assessment of progress toward these stated goals. We should note 
that insofar as Functional Contextualism is one variety of contextualism, for which successful 




best way in which to achieve the goal of successful working. That is, the proof is in the 
pudding. 
 As noted in the target article, there are other potential issues with the pragmatic 
orientation. Chief among these issues is the evaluation of the truth criterion of successful 
working, which is argued to rely on the correspondence of statements with events in the 
world. The argument runs as follows, in order to evaluate successful working it is necessary to 
evaluate the relationship between a statement about successful working (i.e., a statement 
about an intended practical end) and an event in the world to which that statement refers (i.e., 
the occurrence of the practical end). This evaluative activity is an assessment of 
correspondence – an assessment of how a statement maps onto, or refers to, an event. Thus, in 
order to evaluate successful working, pragmatism relies, at least to some extent, on a weak 
form of correspondence. This is justified by pragmatists on practical and not ontological 
grounds. However, the argument that evaluations of successful working are based on 
correspondence with an events in the world is difficult to counter within the confines of 
everyday discourse. 
One way to do so is to suggest that the talk and the talked about are not entirely 
separate. There is then nothing that can be said about anything. This undermines the 
referential nature of statements within individuals, and precludes an evaluation of successful 
working by anyone. An alternative method of dealing with the issue of correspondence 
involves suggesting that statements made about an independent reality can only be assessed 
with regard to a particular behavioral stream (Barnes-Holmes, 2000). This, however, 
undermines the referential nature of statements across individuals, and similarly precludes the 
evaluation of successful working by others. An analyst is free to accept this position, but it is 
acknowledged by its author to be pointless, at least in this respect (but see Barnes & Roche, 




“… an observer's description of his or her observations cannot be 
understood to reflect an absolute or universal reality, but merely the 
reality historically and uniquely experienced by the observer. No 
description is free from the idiosyncratic and cultural histories of the 
describer. Pragmatism, as such, does not overcome the problem of 
bias in truth-telling, it merely entertains multiple biases.” (L.J. Hayes, 
1997, p 585).  
This passage clearly highlights the problem. It also states the solution. Entertain 
multiple biases. This solution, ‘holding terms lightly’, is adopted by Functional 
Contextualism, and is presented in several Functional Contextualist writings (Wilson, 2016). 
If instead of pursuing these arguments about correspondence to the nth degree, we step back 
from the limit and return to the everyday world, where aside from differentiating the purposes 
of analysts, these arguments are of little practical import. Words do refer. The reference can 
be clarified, but not demonstrated. Some level of correspondence between statements and 
verifiable experiences is assumed on practical, not ontological, grounds. Although analysts 
have a unique history of behavior, and the impact of these differences in individual histories 
on correspondence may not be simple, they cannot be escaped, and still, efforts to 
communicate are made. It is possible to speak ontologically to get things done (Barnes & 
Roche, 1997, Barnes-Holmes, 2005), and doing so does not require adopting assumptions 
with ontological implications. In this way the pragmatism of Functional Contextualism 
resolves the issue of correspondence by either ignoring it or acknowledging it, and then 
appealing to pragmatism. 
Note that the issue of talk about events in the world is dealt with in a similar manner in 
Interbehaviorism. Knowledge generation involves investigative activities, and the events 




properties. That is, the analyst speaks of things, and actions with respect to things. No more 
and no less. Thus, in Interbehaviorism “Reality problems do not enter into the scientific 
domain at all. Rather, the problems are those of efficiency and achievement.” (Kantor, 1959, p 
214). 
As mentioned above Functional Contextualism is pragmatic if it proves to aid the 
effective action of individuals adopting its perspective. It is possible that some of the 
descriptions arising from Functional Contextualism do not afford efficient practical action. It 
is also possible that some of the practices arising from Functional Contextualism may 
frustrate successful working. Readers may note the irony that Functional Contextualism is not 
always functional. When we found that Functional Contextualism did not serve our ends well, 
we turned to concepts described within Interbehaviorism. We acknowledge that by doing so 
we did not depart from a Functional Contextualist perspective, rather we adapted it so that it 
facilitated our analytic goals. This is more in line with a generally non-dogmatic approach to 
pragmatism (see S.C. Hayes, 1993). Indeed, the strength of Functional Contextualism is that 
Functional Contextualism itself is held lightly. 
Reaching for Interbehavioral Concepts. 
It is relatively easy to see why Interbehaviorism may aid the Functional Contextualist. 
L.J. Hayes and Fryling (2019) note Interbehaviorism is a well-defined philosophical system 
developed over the course of several decades. In addition, its psychological outgrowth, 
Interbehavioral Psychology, has been the subject of a book length treatment (Kantor, 1959). 
In contrast, Functional Contextualism is outlined in roughly a dozen articles and book 
chapters (e.g., S.C. Hayes, 1993, Biglan & S.C. Hayes, 1996; Barnes & Roche, 1997; S.C. 
Hayes, 1997; Gifford & S.C. Hayes, 1999; Barnes-Holmes, 2000; S.C. Hayes, Barnes-
Holmes, & Roche, 2001; Barnes-Holmes, 2005; Fox, 2006; S.C. Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & 




singly devoted to the explication of Functional Contextualism. Functional Contextualism is, 
of course, a more recent addition to the set of behavioral epistemologies, nonetheless, it 
remains the case that it is less explicitly articulated than its Interbehavioral counterpart. In 
light of this difference in articulation there is reason to suspect that there are aspects of the 
Interbehavioral tradition that may be of use to analysts of a Functional Contextual orientation. 
Indeed, there are several benefits to doing so. We will illustrate this point by describing a 
specific instance in our own analyses of behavior. 
Private events - Is relating something that is done ‘inside the head’? 
Functional contextualism, following the path cleared by Skinner (1945), admits a 
place for private events in analyses of behavior. This place for private events in analyses is 
made on pragmatic grounds (Skinner, 1974, Biglan & S.C. Hayes, 2016), and private events 
are not seen as the end point of an explanatory analysis because they do not permit prediction-
and-influence (S.C. Hayes & Brownstein, 1986). Private events are retained, however, on the 
basis that it is the verbal behavior of the scientist that is critical in achieving scientific goals, 
and if speaking about private events produces more effective action then this talk should be 
retained. This is an important technical point. However, we will leave the analysis of 
scientific behavior to one side for a moment. Instead, we would like to suggest that in 
conducting an analysis it is useful to retain a focus on the acceptable products of such an 
analysis – constructions which permit successful interaction with behavior. Critically, in 
Functional Contextualism the talk about private events is not clearly separated from talk about 
publicly observable events. For example, Skinner (1945) argues that private behaviors are no 
different in essence to publicly observable behaviors. This can pose unnecessary difficulties 
during the constructional activities of an analyst. Allow us to elaborate. 
In the target article L.J. Hayes and Fryling note that in relation to hypotheses, theories, 




actual interbehavior with the things and events investigated …” (L.J. Hayes & Fryling, 2019, 
p 121). The separation of constructs from events provides a clear delineation of acceptable 
subject matter in an analysis of behavior: interrelationships of natural events are acceptable 
subject matter; the rest is a construction. This applies equally to the domains for which private 
events are frequently invoked. Private events do not involve interbehavior. According to this 
view thinking and remembering are not private events but constructions of publicly 
observable events (see Fryling & L.J. Hayes, 2010, 2014). 
The distinction between constructs and events is highlighted by the following question 
regarding relational responding: is relating something happens ‘inside the head’?1 Consider 
the following examples. First imagine a typical procedure to assess relational responding. A 
fear evoking function is established for stimulus A, a relationship is established between 
stimulus A and B such that A < B, and the functions of B are then assessed with a skin 
conductance measure. If B comes to evoke more fear than stimulus A, we might conclude that 
B acquired its functions based on its relationship with A. Critically, the relational response is 
not observed. After observing changes in the function of B (i.e., neutral to fear evoking), a 
relational response is inferred. This aspect of studying relational responding is not generally 
made as explicit as it is here. The argument, however, is not entirely new. For example, 
Dymond and Barnes (1994) argued that “the observed pattern of a transfer of functions 
defines the entailed relations, and thus the entailed relations (e.g., symmetry and equivalence) 
do not exist as a behavioral event until a specific transfer of functions has occurred” (p. 264, 
italics in original).2 Thus, although it is possible to conclude that the participant has related A 
                                                 
1 This rhetorical question was asked by Mitch Fryling during an informal meeting at the Conference of European 
Association for Behavior Analysis. In RFT terms, of course, relating is always an over-arching temporally 
extended act in context, and thus the idea that relating occurs ‘inside the head’ is inconsistent with the RFT 
definition. Nonetheless, while there is a place for private events within an analysis the question of relating inside 
the head is entirely reasonable. 
2 This argument has also been made by Barnes & Roche (1996, p 497), and Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche 
(2001, pp. 33-34) “The contextually controlled qualities of mutual entailment, combinatorial mutual entailment, 
and transformation of stimulus functions are outcomes, not processes. They do not explain relational frames: 




and B ‘inside their head’, this act of relating will not have been observed directly. What has 
been observed is the extended event previously described (i.e., the interbehavior involved in 
A acquiring a function, a relationship being established between A and B, and, critically, the 
function of B being tested). What we attempt to highlight here is that the term “relational 
response” summarizes a spatio-temporally extended set of situated behavioral events, and 
does not refer to a single event that can be isolated to a particular moment in time and hence 
be observed directly (e.g., a response at the moment of the test when stimulus B is presented 
to the participant). Similarly, reinforcement as a process is never observed directly. What is 
observed are differences in the rate of responding at different points in time, after application 
of contingent consequences that increase the rate of responding and extinction procedures that 
reduce the rate of responding. The procedures and behaviors are observed, but the construct of 
reinforcement as a process is not observed, it is inferred. Events are observed, but causal 
constructs are not. 
Now imagine a more complex example in which more instances of relational 
responding may be inferred. Novel stimuli A, B, C and D, are provided functions and 
relations are established such that A = B, and C = D. Participants are asked to confirm or deny 
whether A and B are related in the same way as C and D (see left panel of Figure 1). 
Participants are likely to confirm that these stimuli are related in the same manner and select 
the response option ‘Yes’. If they do so successfully, have they related the stimuli ‘inside their 
heads’? If so, which stimuli were related and how were they related? How might this be 
assessed? If I attempt to assess an interpretation involving private events by manipulating 
environmental variables, which private response(s), if any, change(s) as a function of these 
manipulations? For example, if the functions of stimulus A are altered from “+” to “-” 
multiple elements of this stimulus constellation change (compare the left and right panels of 




relations. This suggests that a single environmental manipulation can result in the alteration of 
multiple private responses. This may pose a behavioral control problem if we have concluded 
that the stimuli are being related ‘inside the head’. The more an analysis involves private 
events, the less of a role played by the manipulable context. Allowing for private events may 
thus serve to undermine achieving prediction-and-influence via contextual control, which is 
the truth criterion of Functional Contextualism itself. 
 
Figure 1. A depiction of two hypothetical instances of relating relations. The ‘correct’ 
response is underlined. 
 
In contrast, Interbehaviorism does not allow for private events. When an 
interbehavioral analysis fails to appeal to interbehavior, talk of events is left behind and talk 
of constructions begins, but the domain ‘inside the head’ remains unanalyzed. The distinction 
between constructs and events is not made clear in Functional Contextualism, which can have 
unfortunate and, likely unintended, consequences. The practical consequence of the 
delineation is that it makes for more efficient study of the observed events. Allow us to stress 




analyses of complex behaviors. In conducting these analyses, it was tempting to incorporate 
unobservable mediating relational responses that could not be linked to particular observable 
stimuli and manipulated independently of other mediating relational responses. This would 
have been unacceptable to both Functional Contextualists and Interbehaviorists; for 
Functional Contextualists on the grounds that it would have resulted in non-manipulable 
mediating responses (S.C. Hayes & Brownstein, 1986); for Interbehaviorists on the basis that 
by invoking events occurring ‘inside the head’ the question does not involve acceptable 
subject matter and so does not arise (i.e., interbehavior; Kantor, 1959, see also Fryling & L.J. 
Hayes, 2009). 
Let us be clear and state that both sets of analysts would likely produce similar 
historical explanations. History is a causal factor in both philosophies,3 and the talk about 
private events will eventually cede to talk about historical environmental interactions. In our 
case, the analyses were resolved by embracing Kantor’s description of permitted subject 
matter and the field construct. The point here is not that reading Kantor was a necessary cause 
in this resolution, rather it is that the separation between constructs and events that is made in 
Interbehavioral writings can have a significant bearing on the behavior of scientists. A 
philosophical framework can prevent the asking of unanswerable questions. In this case, 
Functional Contextualism did not do so (at least not for the current authors). 
The treatment of private events in Functional Contextualism is quite technical (see the 
beginning of this section on p 5). The subtlety of this technical analysis can easily go missing 
however, and private events may be admitted and remain unanalyzed for a time. This is hardly 
surprising given that Functional Contextualism exists in a culture where dualism is 
commonplace. The practical benefits of such a technical treatment of private events can be 
questioned, as we have done here. It may be wise to guard against issues arising from the 
                                                 
3 In both philosophies functional relations between current and historical behavioral episodes are part of their 




Functional Contextualist treatment of private events by adopting the Interbehavioral definition 
of subject matter, and embracing the separation of constructs and events. This separation may 
also be of use in dealing with the tendency to slip toward mechanism within Functional 
Contextualism.4 Another important consequence of the distinction between constructs and 
events is that it discourages the analyst from studying their own constructions. For example, 
instead of attempting to falsify a construction by comparing it to an alternative construction, 
the two constructions can be compared as tools to achieve prediction-and-influence. This 
perspective is practical for the additional reason that it saves time that might be put into 
repeating demonstrative activities. That is, the activity that lead to the generation of a 
particular construction need not be repeated, instead activities that refine a construction as a 
tool for prediction-and-influence may be engaged in. Interbehaviorism may thus serve as an 
antidote to the retardative impact such practices that may arise from Functional Contextualism 
as it is currently formulated. 
A second concept articulated by Interbehaviorists that we found to be of particular use 
in our analyses is the interbehavioral field (e.g., Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & 
McEnteggart, 2020, Finn, 2020). We will limit our description of the interbehavioral field to 
the components which had a bearing on our analytic activities. We do not consider our 
description of the interbehavioral field to be complete, and neither should it be taken to be so. 
For more detailed descriptions we direct the interested reader to those provided elsewhere 
(e.g., L.J. Hayes and Fryling (2018) for a brief introduction, and Kantor (1959) for a more 
complete description). 
At its simplest the interbehavioral field deals with the interaction of individuals with 
stimulus objects, and does so on the basis of their previous interactions with stimulus objects. 
                                                 
4 “… when I divide an event into pieces and distinguish verbs from manipulable nouns, I am 
beginning to treat context as a mechanical object: I am only a short step away from 




An important aspect of this construction is that stimulating and responding are taken as a 
unity. Stimuli do not elicit responses rather they participate in a stimulus-response function, a 
function which is bidirectional and changes continuously across time. The construction 
implies that particular features of the environment are not seen as operating in isolation on a 
particular response. The construction also makes clear the historical nature of current 
environmental interactions. To illustrate the impact of this construction on our analytic 
activities we return to the examples we described earlier involving simple relational activity 
(i.e., A < B) and more complex relational activity (i.e., if A = B and C = D, are the stimulus 
pairs related in the same manner?). In both cases it is clear that there is no relating performed 
‘inside the head’. Rather, in the first case when the function of stimulus B has changed, the 
analyst can engage in constructional activity and infer that its function has changed based on 
its established relationship with A. 
 A slightly different analysis applies in the second case (where A = B, and C = D). The 
elements of complex stimulus arrangements combine to form the stimulation component in 
the unity of stimulating and responding. Thus, the question of individual responses to 
individual elements in isolation is rendered non-sensical. The stimulus arrangement presented 
in asking the question ‘are the stimulus pairs related in the same manner?’ will be responded 
to based on the acquired properties of that stimulus constellation. Critically, these acquired 
properties are different at time point 1 and time point 2. When the function of stimulus A is 
altered and presented within an analogy the result is a reconstitution of the interbehavioral 
field (compare the right and left panels of Figure 1), and two different patterns of responding 
may be expected. 
The field construct is helpful when dealing with complex behavioral episodes. “From 
an Interbehavioral perspective, cause and effect amount to nothing more than a covariance of 




description of a potent tool for an analyst. The description highlights that at best the 
manipulations of an environment made by an analyst will bring about changes to the variance 
in observed behaviors given particular arrangements of the field. If a particular variable is 
introduced and the behavior of interest is altered as a result, the new variable constitutes a 
factor in the newly constituted behavioral field that interacts with and depends on the other 
factors in the field. Of course, the impact of the new variable must be interpreted based on 
previous interbehavioral episodes in which it participated. The historically-determined 
influence of the complex stimulus arrangement may be inferred by comparing observed 
responding when particular interbehavioral histories with regard to their sub-elements are 
present and absent. 
The Interbehvioral approach has been criticized for treating all elements of a field 
constellation as being of equal importance on the grounds that it does not specify where to 
start thereby paralyzing the analyst (see Hayes, Blackledge, & Barnes-Holmes, 2001, p 8). 
The argument begins by noting that the constituent elements of an interbehavioral field are of 
equal importance. This implies that it is not possible to single out a particular element, or 
factor, as being of particular importance to the target phenomenon. The argument concludes 
that Kantor’s interbehavioral system does not aid experimental analyses because it fails to 
emphasize particular elements of the target phenomenon. An alternate analysis is equally 
plausible – the field construct does not specify where to start and thereby frees the analyst to 
interact with complex phenomena by starting anywhere. Ultimately, where the analyst does 
choose to start will be informed by their own (inter)behavioral history. On this final point 
Interbehaviorism and Functional Contextualism do not appear to differ (S.C. Hayes, 1993). 
In closing, we would like to echo L.J. Hayes and Fryling in decrying the arbitrary 
distinction between functional and descriptive contextualisms. The unfortunate consequence 




Contextualists, which is all the more unfortunate when considering Hayes and Fryling’s 
argument that Kantor’s work should not be taken as an example of descriptive contextualism. 
As part of an effort to redress this we have attempted to illustrate how drawing on Kantorian 
concepts has enriched our own work. Of course, we are not suggesting that the 
Interbehaviorism of Kantor is simply adopted in whole cloth, but rather the field concept 
should not be discarded due to its loose and erroneous association with descriptive 
contextualism. Even if our analyses of complex phenomena can be performed in another 
manner, it would still be appropriate to engage fully with the work of eminent scholars in the 
Interbehavioral tradition. Indeed, in what is often difficult terrain for a contextualist we should 
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